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RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS
Brunson i\lacChcsncy
TIll! problems involved in the ~lJbjeel
of reeognition in international law arc
imporlant onC8, cv{~n though they laek
the dramatie appeal of such topie:-: a~
war and pea!:e, ouler ~paee, and on'an
~I'aee. Sim'l' :;tale:; an' lhc basic unil:; in
lhl' inll'rnalional legal sY'otem, rl'l"o)!nition plays a vilal roll' in tlw deterlninalion of 1he qualified actors in tlw
:;ysll'm. Similarly. whal govern IIIl'nl
rl'pn':;('nl:; a ,.;lall' i~ a :;i/!:nifil'anl maltl'r.
~ lorl'o\'('r. t hI' e)l.('h·i:;(' of juri:;didion hy
all(,~l'd :;lale:; and /!:ovcrnnH'nl::: may
dl'pcnd for its l'ffeeli\'el\(~~s on reco/!:nition. The ~uhjcct is not an ea~y one to
explain or undersland. There is a vast
amount of state practice that is rar from
l'!lIIsist(~nt, a clash of doctrinal explanalion. and a hewildl'ring variety of tcnninolo~y.

I{('('o)!nilion involVl's thc que:;lion of
what altitude :;;tal('~ will take with 1'1'ganl to a variety of factual situation:;
and th(' legal con:::el)uenees that !low
frolll formal rccognition of the$(~ situaliol1~. a::: wl·1I a::: I'Will llll' 110Ill'l'l'o/!:nitiol1 of :;Ul'h $ilualion:;. i\lajor an'a:;
!:onl"l'r11 the exisLelll'c of slate:;, governments. war, neutrality, hclligcrcney, and
the erfect of nonrecognition of illegal

claims to territory. The primary rocus
of this lecture will 'be 011 the problems
arisin/!: out of recognition and nonrecognition of statcs and governnH'nts.
The requisites for statehood in international law have heen formulated in
various ways, hut thcre is substantial
agreement that tl)(~re llIust be an independent govel'llment exereh;ing effective
authority within a relatively welldefined an:a. The major doctrinal eontroversy has hl'en whether a IWW ('ntity
with these eharaeteri:::ties lweonw:; a
Slate only through recognition by the
existing states in thc world co""nunity,
or whether the attainment of the relJuisite factual characteristics by a new
entity makes it a state prior to any
recognition by existing states? In the
books, the controversy is referred to as
one betwcen the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition.
The traditional constitutive theory
has heen that new entities do not
beeollle states until they arc recognized;
i.e., that only recognition eonsLitutc~
tire state, and tlrat each exiHLin~ sl"te is
under no duty to recognize a new 1'lItity
that Iras allailll'd the rt'ljl,i:;ite flletual
eharactcristics. III the absence of any
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procedures for collective recognition of
a new entity, this mcant that an entity
might be n'eo~ni1.l'd hy ~onH! ~tatl's bul
not by olhcrs. A furthcr thcoretical
consequence was that the new entity, if
unrecognized, was not a subjcct of
international law and therefore allegedly
had no rights or obligations under international law.
The late Professor Lauterpacht made
an important modifieation in constitutive theory by arf!uing that existing
state~ were undl'r a duly to n'('of!nize a
new entity lhat mel lhl' requisilc fadual
charaderistics. His book on rccognition
elahorates his argument and purports to
find ~upport for it in state praetice. IIi:;
aq.(uml'nt, if al'c"plt'd in practicl', would
do much lo obviate lhl' po:;:;ibililil':; of
an cnlity lwing recogni1.ed by somc
slales and not by others. It would
introduce order into a vital aspect of
in ternational relations. It would also, if
:;imilarly acceptl'll, decrease the praetical importance of an entity thcoretically
not subjcct to rights and dutics under
international law .
tinder the declaratory theory, an
entity which allains the requisite factual
eharaeteristies therehy commences its
existence a:; a state under international
law without the need of rceognition by
exi:;ting slal!~s and is accordingly from
that point forward a subjcct of inll'rnational law with all thc rights and
duties of a slale. Hecognilion, under
this theory, serves only to declare what
already existed and to indicate a willingness on the part of the recognizing state
lo accord the recognized state the privileges of a state. This is normally accompanied hy the opening of diplomatic relations between the two states.
Under this theory the recognizing state
is also under no duty to recognize the
ncw entity, but, since, under thal
theory, the entily is almady a statc, the
concl'ptnal and practical diffil'ulties
pOH'd by thl' conSlitutive theory do nol
Anolher way of stating the sallie

prohlem is to ask whether recognition is
governed hy legal rulcs or is domina led
hy politil'al eon~ille"'ltions. l,aull'rpacht's constitutive theory favors the
former while the declaratory view favors
the latter. Most modern AngloAmerican writers disagree with Lauterpacht. And, in my opinion, state practiee, as a principal creator of international law, lends more support to the
declaratory and political views. This is
not to say that states totally ignore legal
considerations or that in many instance:;
statl's do not reach the same results
regardless of theories.
Although the foregoing discussion
related to the recognition of states, the
same I'ontrovl'r~y I~xist~ with respl'd to
rl'eognition of governments of existing
stales. The United States both in theory
and practice adheres to the declaratory
vil:w, as was vigorously delllonstrated by
AlTlha~sador AIIstin in the tlnited Nations in defending till' imnll:diate recognition of the provisional goverrllnl:nt of
Israel as the de facto authority of the
new statc. ()n the other hand, the
United Kingdom, in an official statement by the Foreign Secretary in 11):> I,
defined their recognition policy in constitutive terms. Although their recognitioll of the Communist Chinese Covernment could be considered as consistent
with that theory, their rclatiolls with
sOllle other Communist regimes is impossihle to squarc wilh that tlll·ory. An
example is their continllcd nonreeognitioll of I~ast (;ermany.
It is apparently paradoxieal that,
while there is no ah'l'eement with respect
to the legal character of recognition,
there is a suhstan tial consenslls that
premature recognition is a violation of
international law. For example, a state
that recogni1.es a ncw entity that does
not have the requisite characteristics has
injurcd the existing state out of which
the new entity elaims to have fontll'd a
~late. By way of a na 10:..')' , in our Civil
War the Uniled States daimell that
{;n'at Britain's Prodamation of Neu-
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trality, which consequentially rccognized thc bdligereney of the Confederate SLaLes, was premaLurt!. In view
of the prior United SLates Proelamation
of a Blockade, our arguinent was Clearly
unsound. Ilowever, it should he noted
that Great Britain never recognized the
Confederacy as a state or government
but only as a belligerent.
This reference to bclligerency as an
intermediate status short of recognition
as a sLate or government leads conveniently to a discussion of the usc of
the terllls de facto and de jure in
connection wiLh recognition. Thc terms
arc used in differcnt contexts and arc
not givcn a consistenL meaning. SomeLimes, de facio is u:;ed to indicaLl' LhaL
the recognition being cXLended is tcnLative. It is not the recognition that is de
facto: the oLher state or government is
heing Ln!ated as a de facto enLity. Thc
Lerm is also used to dl!serihe policies 0 f
recogniLion. An I:xalllple is the exLending of reGognition Lo any regime that is
in effective control of the state regardless of other considerations. Although
the question is debatable, it is believed
useful in practice to be able to deal with
recognition in stages and permit the
intermediate step of recognizing a
regime as de facto prior to a possible
further recognition as a regime de jllre.
The problem of recognition of states
obviously occurs less frequently than
the questioll of recognition of governments. Although occasionally a new
sLate has emerged from a territory not
previow;ly organized as a staLe, the more
typical issue arises out of an allcml'L hy
a rebel group to secede from a parent
staLe, either in part of its existing
territory, or in what was formerly, for
example, a colonial terri Lory . In this
context it is easy to UlulersLand why
premature recognition was an offense.
As previously indicaLed, the generally
an:el'Led test of statehood is thaL of an
illdl'IHmdl'lIt govl'rnnll'lII I'xl'rl'i:;illg I'ffectiv{! authoriLy within a relalively 11t:fined arl'a. Implil'il in thl$l! rl'quirt,-

ments, or possibly an allllitiollal criterion, is that it reasonably appears that
t hl$l! reI( uirenwnls will I:onl illlill 10 III'
satisfied. TIll: practice of tlw lInitl!d
States until recent times has been fairly
consistent in the application of this test
to new entities seeking statehood. It is
perhaps best illustrated in tIl<: eourse of
our recognition of the new states in
Latin America in the early 19th century. The United Kingdom has, until
recent timcs, also followed essentially
the same policy. Since World War II our
action with rcspect to tl\(: governnwnt
of Comlllunist China, and the alleged·
states and governments of East Gl'rlIIan)" North Korea, and North Vielnam
has hel!l\ hased on diffl!rent l'on~illl'ra
tions. A~ Kaplan and Kutzenhuch point
out, reeognition, or rather nonrecognition, in relation to the opposing bloc, is
primarily a political weapon. In tIll!
of an ovcrall 8eLtlenll'nL, tlll'se
oLllI'r allel-(ed I-(overllnll!nts allll !llutel:'
81~I:m rt~a~olla('ly permalll'nt, yl'l WI: will
continue to witlrhold rccognition. Although, after Worlll War I, the IJlw::otion
of reeol!nition of tire ~ovil't (;OVCrllIlll!nt was not. technically, a mall{'r or
reco~nition of a state, their IIra:;tic
break with tlrc pal:'t lIIade it a similar
Ijue::otion in policy terms.
Since World War I L anll I'arlieularly
in reGent year:;, our prat:lil'l: willr
rC81'I'et to the ret:ognition of new l:'tatl'l:'
in ,\fro-Asia has al::;o hCI'n (,a~I!11 on
different criteria. lIere, the rapill ending
of colonialism and tire plannell Im'paration of new stall'S for illllt'pl!ndl!lH:I'.
either unrler the auspicI:::O of lhe Unitl'd
Nations or by the parcnt powers such as
England and Francc, has led to almo::ot
instantaneous recognition or even recognition prior to official independence. As
Kuplan and Katzenhaelr point out, COIIIpetition with the ~oviet Union was
eertainly a faetor. Mort'ovl:r, frt'lJllently
no rt!al eonsideration wus ~ivI'n to lhe
I'rospr:cLs of pl'rnl<llIl'l1I:Y of II\(: nl'w
stutl'S, nor 10 tire essl'nliul cffectivem'ss
of their rt':rimes.
ah!ll~nee

693
The n'cognilion of govern lIIen Lo;
signifiranlly different i~ues. The
8hllt~. aln~lIIly re~l:ogni1.I'd, conlinue:s lo
cxist as a slall: and lhl: Ilucslion is
whl!lhl~r a parlicular nlhrlmc is the govcrnment of thal slalc. In the normal and
rouline: eascs of changes of governmenl,
no el'lIlslion or need of recognilion
arises. Il is in cases of revolulionary
chanw: where thrre arc at le:ast two
eOlllpl'linl! c1aimanls thal lhc issue heIIOnle:; ;wlIle. While lhen' might hI' saill
lo bl: a pre'sumplion in favor of lhl:
I't:lablislll'd governmenl, onee lhl're:
1\II~ues a genuine civil war, the onlcollw
of whirh it: douhlful. lhen the allilude
of ollll'r t:lale'~ lowards the l'lainmlll:;
bl'l'IlI111'S imporlanl. It is for Ihis silualion Ihal lhl' mh,s wilh re'spl:t'l 10
rCl'ognilion of gOVl'rIImenls arc .11'signed,
As prc:\'iOlI8Iy noll'd, during lhc civil
slrllgl-lle lhl: righL<; and ohligalions of thc
slatl: l'onlinllll. Tlw i:;,;lIl: is which eOIllpclinl-l c1aimanl represe'nls that sLale for
L1w purpose of eonlinuily. In the case of
IWW govcrrllnenls, the lIIinimum inlernaliouallaw reei uimment for rccognilion is
lhal L1w n:ginw is in c:rfeclive conlrol of
lhl: territory ano populalion of thc
statl:, or, more conlroversially, conlrols
a suhslantial part of lhe: populalion and
le'rrilory, and il is rl'asonably dl'ar it
will SUI'(\I'I'd in displal'ing Ihl' prl'vinm;
govl'rnnwnl. Thl: lalli'" alte:rnalivl: ohvionsly misl:s ddicall: qucslions of judgmcnt. and the possiuililes of premalure
n~eognitiCJn are apparent. A slale: lhat
n'I'ogni1.I's a nllW rc'gillll' on this minimUIII ha:::i::: of I'ffl'clivl'lil'ss lIIay be saio
lo follow a de facto policy of n:eognilion. Thl: Uniled Slales. however. c10es
not accept this as the solc tcst and in
theory rcquircs. in addition, lhat the
rehel regiml: giVl: m3surances lhat it will
honor thl: ohIigaliom; of the slate undcr
inll'rnaliollal law and applicahll: inlernalional agl'l:I'nllmls. Inmon: modern
liml's, parlicnlarly in IIII' ea:;e of Ihe
Spanish Civil War. a prill:tiee was devdoped. 1'~pI:I:ial\y hy the Uniled Kingrai~es

dom, of abandoning an either/or approach and treating a revolulionary
rc:ginH: as Ihl: l'ffl'I:live: rc:gime in parlof
lhe territory of a slale. This is what the
United Kingdom did wilh respel:llo the
Franco forcI~s prior lo the conclusion of
that civil war.
Ln carlicr times various other additional conditions for recognition were
advanced. During the monarchical era
sOllie aLlcmpls lo insist on legilimaey of
sut:cl·:.<,;ion were malic:, hut proved inl'ffl'c:lual. It is pallmt why this was so. It
is the rl'volulionary change: that .... ise:;
Ihe prohle'm, and rc:volulion is invariahly i\ll'~al IlIlller the law of lhe
,;Iall' in q ueslion. But revolulion is not
ill"gal ulllh·,· inll'rnalional law. Thl' inIt'rnaliollal law sy:.<lt·m is nol organi1.l'd
lo ilOlil:e Ihl! inlernal n:lalion,; of its
memhers. III the Tilloco 1\ rbitration,
Chief Juslice Taft, liS sole arbilralor,
made this point explicilly. lie also hdd
in thatl:asl: lhat, frolll the slandpoint of
an international trihunal. lhl' lesl of
effeclivencss determines which government has eapacity to hind the slale.
Another reason oeeasionally invoked
for denying recognilion is oh:icl:lion lo
thc inhumane methods cmployed hy tlH:
rehcl faelion as distin~uished frolll lheir
iIIegilimate orip;in. Inslances arc (;"reat
Brilain's aLlitudl' loward the French
Hevolution. and the alliluc\e of lhe
Uniled Slales and others toward lhe
inilial gt:i1.l1re of power by thl' Soviels.
Bill lhis. too. does not provc lo be
effeclive in an international syslcm
wilhoul power 10 dl'al wilh oUlrageous
condllc:L hy wdl-eslabli:.<hed regimes. lo
say nOlhing of rc:vollllionary regimes.
Only an cffective! world govcrnment will
be able lo cxcreise sueh a power, and
present prospects for such a development arc nol eneourap;ing.
!{e:ferencc has alreadv hecII made lo
lhl' Uniled Slates additional condilion
for rC'col!"ilion. 11l1llH'ly. Ihal Ihe: rl'gimt:
ill qurslion illdiralr:.< il,; willinl!lll'~ lo
fulfill ils oblil!alions uneIe-.. inlernalional
law and applieablc: inlerualional al-,rrel'-
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IIIents. This policy was not ori!!inally
followed ..kfferson stated in connection
wiLh til(' Fn~r)(:h \{evolutioll that our
policy was to rcco~lIil'.e allY ~overrlJllI'ut
"which is fornwd by the will of the
natioll', suhstantially declared." SOllie
have asserted that, except for the Wilsonian illterlude to he melltioned later,
this policy has heell consistcntly followed. Lauterpaeht refers to it as. in
ess\'nce, a rcquiremellt of the eOIlSt'IIt of
the !!overned ill ordt'r to demollstratc
that the re~ime will he effeetiVl" wit h
prospeeL" of permanellcy. lie further
asserts that hoLh the United States alld
the Ullited Kinl!dom pur""l'd thit< policy
with fair consisll'lIc), until the elld of
thl' fin;t Wmld Wilr. Ohviously, the tl'~1
is fill' fmm preei~I' alld was variously
inll'rprl'll'd in pral'liee. In SOInl' illstances it ealled for free dl'elions,. while
in olher,; popular eOllscnt was inferred
Oil Ihc basis of very inconclusive evideneeindeed.
Presidenl Wilson added to the principle, especially in connection with
Latin America, the further test of constitulionality under the law of the state
ill question. l\loreovcr, thc Unitcd
Statcs, although not a party, supporLed
the Central-Amcriean Treaties of J <)07
and 1<)2;~ in relation to the parties
therclo. These treaties embodied' a eonslilulional test and additional restrictiolls. Suhseq uelltl)', in tlw 1I0over
ad mi nistra tion, the eonsti tutional test
was ahandoned, and we purported to
revert to the .I effersl.lnian policy.
II 1':111 he said Ihal. followinl! World
\\ ar I. the n:lJuirenwllt or popular I'onsent was gradually abandoned hy hoth
the United States and the United K ingdom in the face of the rise of dictatorial
governmenls exercising effective power.
This neccssarily brid survey of varying
allitude" of the United Slatcs should
not suggest that anyone test has necessarily been consistently applied in any
pl'riod. 'fhi" i" ('l'rlainly lrue at the
prescnt lillle. WI' wOllld appear to have
several policies. In Latin A IIwrica we

have developed a practice or informal
consultatioll wiLh the other members of
IIII' ()r:.~anil'.alion or AIIlI'ril':1II Slalt'!\
with n'sJlI~el 10 till! reeognilion or dl!
faciO governlllellts in L1ral an'a. Whill~
thc eOllsultation is collecLiv(~, thl~ individual m(~mber slate rctains Lire powcr
of ultimate decision. In the Resolution
of the OAS emhodying this procedure,
it is interestinl! to note Lhat sLress is laid
on free clections and willingness to
honor intl'rnational ohlil!ations as the
principal criteria to he lak(m inLo ae(,Ollnt. On the other hand, in rdation to
the COlllmunisL blo(~ or hloes, our policy
wilh res(ll't:I to n'eol!nitioll of /!OVl'rnIllellis. jusl as ill thl' ('a~I' of III'W
COII\lllullisL slall's, has hel'lI l!0V('I'I\('t1 hy
polilil'al ('llllsitll'raLiolls in the context
of Ihl' "('old war."
Bdore prOl:eetlillg to nonrecognition,
it might he useful to refer bridly to thl~
modes, or lIIeLhods, of reeoglli tioll. Thl:
state or governmcnt seckillg recognition
obviously wanls to inLerpret mosL ravorably to itself any ambiguous statement or action of other governments
that might imply recognitioll. On the
other hand, the state eomtelllplaLing
recogllition wishes to control Lhe process. Since it is, 1II0re typically, smaller
or weaker states, or the governments
thereof, that arc seeking recognition, it
is the major nations tllat have insisted
that recognition is a maLter of intention
and that allY ambiguous act which
might imply recognition may be negated
by a disclaimer of intention to recognize.
CerL:lin formal acts clearly eonstiLute
recognition, such as an exchange or
reception of ambassadors, or the conclusion of a bilateral treaty. Appointment
and reception of consuls, on the other
hand, does not resulL in recognition
although lhe re(plest for and issll:lnee of
an exequatur probably docs. In the case
of mulLilateral Ireaties, it is, however,
generally al!recd that participaLing as a
party thereLo along with an unrecognil'.ed state or government c10es not
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constitutc recognition. The same view
prevails with respect to participating in
internaLional conferenccs wiLh unrecognized rcgimes. Although thcre was some
original difference of opinion with
respect to memhership in the League of
Nations, expecially when the allegedly
recognizing state voted for admission, it
came to be accepted, and is accepted in
the United Nations, that admission to
mcmhership docs not imply reeognition
on the part of other members that the
entity in question is heing recognized,
apart from memhership, as a state or
government. The practical reasons for
these last few conclu~ions are ohvious.
Any oLher view would p:lralyzc Llw
proc:c:.sscs and in:::LiLuLions involved.
The c:lution of rccognizing sLuLes,
howevcr, even in these :lreas, is iIIusLmted hy :I recent example. The Nuclear
Tc:::t-Ban Treaty provid(:(1 th:lt LIII:
UniL(!d SLates, till! Unitcd Kingdom, and
Lhe Sovict Union should c:lch III: a
(1('spo~iLary and it was clearly understood that East Germany's deposit of its
declaration of acccssion to the Trcaty
with the Soviet Union would have no
effect on its continucd nonrecognition
hy the other depositaries. The United
States conLention that East Germany
would nonctheless he hound by their
accession to the Treaty is more controver:::iaI.
I f we accept intention as the decisive
test, many in formal reiaLions with unrecognized regimes arc possible, such as
negotiations, tempor:lry miliLary agreenllmLs, :lnd contilllmncc of trmli:. Our
v:lriolls d(,alings with the Chinese Communist Government arc a recent demonstraLion of this practice, and there are
many other similar cases. This possihility of maintaining informal relations
wiLh unrecognized regimcs makes more
palatahle and practical the policy of
nonrecognition of slates and governmcnts which mect the criLeria for those
sLaLuses, I>e:;pitc a theoreLicalll'gal void,
tl,,:re is an expedient accommodation to
the Jlrohli~m.

Turning "to the phcnomcnon of nonn'('ol-(niLion of statcs and governnwnt~,
what ,If(' till: Icgal eonS(:'1II1'nC(!:; in
international and uOlllcstic law'! lVlany
of the important conscquences arc in
domestic law, so that hcre we shall be
considering "foreign relations law" as
well as international law, strictly speaking. Accepting the declaratory theory as
in accordance with the practice of
states, we have states and governments
which meet the criteria for recognition
but arc not recognizeu. What arc the
respective rights and duties between the
cxisting entities and such unrecognized
cnliLil':;?
BI'f,'rrinp; Lo our previous disl'II::::;ion
of informal n'lalions, we :;l'C thaI :;oml'
rdaLious lIIay :lnd do t:lke pl:lee bet wecn thelll. Speaking p;enerally, thc
unrecognized entity, be it slate or governnwnt, whieh has lIIeL LI\(! requisiLe
criteri:l, has the rights of a staLe in
international I:lw, although it e:ln be
prevente(l from exercising them if the
rights can only he exerei:;etl hy a slate,
and the nonrecognizing sLate refuses to
treat the purported ex(~rcise as the
action of the government of Lhe oLlwr
:lHeged state. Tlw 8:1nH! raLionale eontrois with rt!8pect Lo Lhe obligatons of
such an entity. The qlH:stions mainly
arise with respect to unreeogniz('tl I!0Vern meuts rathl'r than slatl's. I t is clt'ar
that tlw nonrecognition of a pilrtieular
governnll!nt tloe~ not tlepriv,! till: sLaLe
of its righLs or relieve it of its tllltil!s
under interniltiO/wllaw undl!r Lhe conditions ~lillt'd. This i::: a l'on!<clp\(!nCI' of
the continuity of states.
Thc previous statemcnts dealt with
established rights and oblig:ltions. But
an unrt!cogni~ed regime meeting the
Iwress:lry criteria can also creall~ new
right:; mul ohligations with res(let:L to iI
sLate th:lt has not reeol!nized it. In the
Tinoco Arbitration previously mentioned, the effective government in
Co:>la Hieil (lhl' Tinol'o Con-mlllent)
was hdd Lo hilvl! hound LhaL slaLe in
n'laLion Lo (:r('at Brilain whieh h:l::: not
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reeognized LhaL governmenL. I\.s Chief

.J usLice TafL poinLed oliL in his opinion,
Lhe usc of nonmeognition as a polilieal
weapon drm;tieally reduces its vailic as
evidence of the nonexistence of an
effective regime.
l'arenLlu:tically, it should he mentioned thaL a recogni)l;ed regime, even
though no longer in control of sOllie or
all of its former Lerritory, continues
with its rights and ohligations and may
create new rights and obligations with
nationals of another state still [('cognizing it, with respect to areas outside
of the rehel regime's eonLrol. Thus, the
puhlie assets of a state with sueh a
recognized rqdlllt:, til(! a~sd~ Iwing 10eated within a staLe ["('cognizing it. will
he awarded by the courts of that recognizing ~tate to the recogni)l;ed government. This was the LreatmenL accorded
hy tlu: eourts of II,,· recognizing states
to the a:;:;<:Is, wiLhin thosc recognizing
states, 0 f the I!0vernmcnls-in-exilc during World War ll. Furthermore, if a state
has one regime which is being recognized as de jure ancI another as de facto
at the same time by a reeogni)l;ing state,
the courts of that state will award the
public funds to the de jILre regime. Two
BriLish dl'ei~ions concerned wiLh Lhe
recognition of Ethiopian claims in England turned on this distineLion, which
demom;tratl's thaI. for domestic law OIL
least, wlll'tlu'r reeogniLion is de fac·to or
elC! jUre! lIIakes a ~igniri(:ant difl'eren(:(!.
The firsL decision held thaL the Emperor, as the ruler ele jUre!, was entitled
to eollc'("L a deht which had at:cmed
before the recognition of the King of
Italy as the ruler de facto. When England subsequently recognized the King
of Italy as the ruler de jllre, in the same
easc on appeal, it was held that the: King
was Lhen entitled to c:ollecL the dehL.
We have heen discussing the rulcs
rdating to unrecognized regimcs meeting tlw relevant criteria. WhaL of the
rights and obligations of unrt'('ogni1.('d
revolutionary r('gilll(,s LhaL do noL nled
till' tesls for an d'fec:live governlllenL

either OIL the Lime of acting or suhsequenLly? Such regimes do not have any
g(!IH'ral ("lIpac:ity lo erellt(: rights and
ohligations in relation to another :;tall~,
huL inLernaLional law docs recogni1.e a
limiLed capacity Lo validatc acls performed in a territory within its control
and relating to routine governmental
administration raLher than in support of
its own ljuest for conLrol of the sLate it
purports to represcnt. I\.n inLernational
arhiLral decision to this effeeL held Lhat
the sale hy such a regime of a po~tal
money order was binding on the state
and its successor recognized governmenL.
Finally, whal is till! l'ff(:d of SUh8(''Im'nt f('('ognition of a ~tat(: or gov\'rnment thaL hau previously met the requisite criLcria·? l{ecognition releases lhe
restrictions that hau prcviously existcd
as to righLs and ohligations thaL Iwd
required aeknowledgmcnt tlll'reof hy
the reeogni)l;ing state. The furlher qucstion of whether recognition is retroactive with respect to acts perforJIH'd
before recognition but after meeting lhe
requisiLe criteria is not governed hy
international la'r. This follows from
acceptance of the theory that there is
no duty to recognize even when lhe
requisite critcria exist. Ilowever, retroactiviLy is si{!niricanL in the internal law
of the recognizing staLe, and the scope
of the principle will be developed in the
suhsequent discussion of tlw donwsti(:
legal consequences of recognition a 1111
nonreeogniLion.
WiLhdrawal of n:cognition is anollll'r
maller which should be brieflv canvassed. In Lheory, if a sLaLe or a government fails lo maintain the requisite
criteria, then wiLhdrawal of recognilion
is appropriate. In praeLice, withdrawal
normaUv occurs when a new state replaces the previously rccognized state,
or a new governmenL is recognized in
place of the preeeding one. The pn~8uJIlption as to the existing authority
applies here. Until 11 new state or governmenL meets the requisiLe eriLeria,
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wiLhdrawal of previous recognition
would he inappropriale. SOnH! authoriti(!s add, however, thal withdrawal is
appropriate if the inilial n-eognition was
tentative--i.e., de facto--and the requisite
criteria have not materialized. The !testatcment of Foreign 1{e1ations Law
states that no instance of withdrawal of
recognition has heen found except in
thc si tuaLions ahove mentioned.
In theory, wiLhdrawal should not hc
baSI-II on disapproval of a recognized
regime_ buL ollly on f'lilurt- to maintuin
the req uisil<- criLeria. In fact, sLaLes
disapproving of u previously recogniz(-(I
regillH! do not withdmw rccognition hut
s!wer diplonUltic relaLions. For cxample,
Gn-at BriL<lill recognized the Soviet
Union de facto mlll subt<e!luently eI(· jure
and <l few years later scvered diplomaLi!:
relations. lIere, therc is a legal curiosity.
Severance of diplorllatic relations docs
not present many of the problems
thought to arise out of nonreeognition.
In the Sabbatillo case, the U.S. Supreme
Court sq uarcly held that the Castro
Cuban Government, as a government
that the United States had recognized,
could sue in the courts of the United
States, despite the severance of diplomatic relations prior to the litigation,
even though the established rule is that
an unrecognized government can not so
sue.
As previously mentioned, some of
tire most significant legal consequences
arising out of nonrecognition are governed by domcstic or national law as
distinguished from international law. Tn
earlier ref!!rence to LII!!' recognizing
state, it was assumed that, for international purposes, it was the executive
braneh of the govcrnment of that state
that made the deeision. [n the domestic
sense, the recognizing organ is a political
braneh of the government. The judicial
branch is not involved. This does not
mean that the executive's action is not
subject lo legal restrainls. On the olher
Irand. the judiciary Iras a significanl role
Lo play on the donH:stic scene. as

distinguished from the international
arena. The main problem for the domestie judieiary is whaL staLm; should 1)('
gl"Hllted to <llld whaL erf!:ct should h!~
given to actions of an entity not recognized by their executive. The complex
and extensive domestic law on this
subject can only he summarized, and
the discussion will be confined to the
domestic law of the United States and
the United Kingdom. In what follows it
is assumed that the unrecognized entity
Iras. in fnel. mel the re!prisitc internationaleriteria.
In the United Kingdom, as wcll as in
the Uniled Slates, an unrecognizcd
governmcnt does not have access Lo tIll!
eour~s as :l plaintiff. On the furth!-.·
!(Ilestion of wheLher an unrecognized
govcrnment is entitled to immunity as a
defendant, some decisions in the United
States have granted immunity, contrary
t() the British view. Our hoMings can be
cxplained on the ground that the state,
as such, is entitled to claim immunity. i\
different result would he reached if
there were also a recognized government
in existence, which could waive the
immunity on behalf of the state.
\Iost of the interesting questions
involve the issue of what effect the
courts should give to legislation and
other action of an unrecognized government. The British decisions have drawn
quite rigidly the logical deduction that
no effect should be given in their courts
to action of a regime unrecognized by
tire British Government. Thus, if the
claimants in the Tilloco case had
brought suit in a Brili~h eourt ralher
than in an international tribunal, the
acts of the effective government in
Cosla Rica would not have bcen "recognized." Even Lauterpacht, who defends
the British position, concedes that it is
workable only so long as the executive
hranch accords rccognition under his
theory that there is a legal duty to
rccognize cntitit-s meelinp; the rcquisile
critl!ria. The 14 years of Ilonrecognilioll
of the Soviet Government hy the Unitl!d
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~tates

tested this theory to the hreaking
point. and eourt::: in the lInited States
took a mort' flt!xihlt! al'l'roadl.
In a :::eries of decisions in the Nt'W
York Court of Appeals, nnder the principal al'gis of .I udge Cardozo, I hl' view
was developed Lhat effeet would noL be
given to the arts of the nnreeognized
So\'i.!t regime unkss 1I0t Lo do :::0 would
violate equity and ju:::tice. This has heen
callcd Lhc "negative public policy" rule
alld is far from an cxact juridical concept. In:::piration for it came from 1I.S.
Suprcme Court decisions with respect to
the legal conscq uences of various acts
that were performcd within Lhl' Confl'dentey during LIIl' Civil \\'ar.
:\ n'eenL New York dl'eision in tIll'
,lIerClln' HIl.~illt'ss .l/llchill(,s case is a
good iilustraLion of an c\'cn mon~ flexihIe approach. An East (;erman corporation. wholly' mvned and eonLrollcd hy
Lhe unrecognized East German Government. sold type\\Titl'rs to a New York
corporation. an importer, which failed
to honor the trade acceptance that it
had given in payment upon receipt of
the typewriters. An American ciLizen
and resident of New York, who was an
a:;:signec for value of the East German
corporation, sued the importer. The
court held that he could recover on this
private transaction even though the East
German Government was not recognized hy the United States. The saIl' and
import of the typewriters was not forbidden by United States law. Under Lhe
circumstances, the court saw no policy
ohjection Lo enforcement of the obligation. :\ difft'renL iSSIH! would arist' out
of a transaction originating in Communist China; trade with which is legally
prohibited. A recent decision of the
/louse of Lords in the Zeiss case, involving the effect of action taken by an East
German entity in East Germany, is also
of inLcrest. That c:ourt held that thc
Soviet Union was the government recognized de jure in tlUlt territory hy the
British government, and Lhat the action
Laken hy the l':ast (;erman regime was in

accordance with authority properly
dt'legat!!d by the Soviet Union, there!.y
avoidillg tht! al'l'li(!ation of tIlt! l!'aditiollally rigid British view whidl wOllld
have given no effeet Lo the action of an
ullrecognizt!d regime.
TI\(! BestatemenL of Foreign Itdations Law in Set'lion 11 ~l defines the
scope of the United StaLl'S exception to
nonreeogniLion of the aeLions of an
unrecogrrizetl regime as IlCing con finet!
Lo malll'rs of an essenLially private
nature within the effective control of
the unreeogni)\t!d enLity, or transfer of
property loeali)\ed at the time of trans·
fer in the t('rritory of tIlt! 'mn'cog\liz(~tl
,'ntily ill It I belonging Ihell 10 a lIalional
Ih,'n'of. Thi~ is a 1I.S. ('onflit,ts ml" mltl
nllt a mIl' of illll'\"naliollal law. III Ihei,'
"OJIIIIH~ntary, they point out, liS tloe:,;
Lhe text of Sectioll 4~, Lhat the so-called
"act of state" doctrine docs 1I0t apply
in the case of all unreeognizcd regime.
Briefly stated, the act of sLate doeLrine,
another U.S. con1liets rule, provides
that a U.S. court will not examine the
validity of an act of a foreigll sLate
within its terri Lory by which that staLe
has exercised its jurisdiction Lo give
effect to its public interests. In cases of
foreign expropriation in violation of
international law, this doctrine has been
modified by congressional action in the
context of the Castro expropriations of
American property. By definition and
practice, the act of state doctrine also
does not usually apply Lo the extraterritorial effect of such acts, even if the
regime is recognized. Thus, a foreign
decree purporting to expropriate property within the United States would be
treated as a nullity in our courts.
The previous discussion related to
the effects given in U.S. courts to acts
of an unrecognized entity meeting the
necessary criteria. If recognition is subsequently granted, courts in the United
States will then Lreat the aets of such a
regime prior to recogniLon as if they hat!
been the acLs of a recognizerl enLity.
Consequently. the act of state docLrine
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will then apply. This retroactivc effect
servcs to validatc previously unrecognized acts, mainly within the entity in
question, as well as to validate the
newly recognized regime's title to puhlie
funds in the recognizing state, as previously discussed. This doctrine of retroactivity does nol extend, however, to
the invalidation of prior transactions
entered into hy the then recognized
government or ohligations of private
parties created by that government. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in the Guaranty
Trust Bank case, enforced this limitation on retroactivity hy holding that the
Soviet Government, suing after it had
been recognized, was barred by the
running of the New York statute 0 f
limitations prior to its recognition, since
the then recognized Kerensky government could have sued the bank and
failed to do so. The Guaranty Trust
Bank was entitled to rely on the action
or nonaetion of the regime thcn recognized by the U.S. Govcrnment.
Only brief mention can be made of
another important use of nonrecognition outside the area of states and
governments as such. This is the doctTine of nonrecognition of illegal action,
such as an illegal conquest of territory.
When states act legally, there is normally no need to notify other states of
the action taken or to receive their
recognition of the legality of the action.
However, when a state acts illegally,
other states singly or collectively, can
but need not declare that they will not
recognize the illegal claim. Sccretary of
State Stim~)Il invoked this doctrine
with rcspeet to Japanese action in IVIanehukuo, and the Leaguc of Nations
passed a Resolution taking the same
position. Of course, in the imperfectly
organized world, fre1lucntly nothing effective is or can bc done to reversc the
iIll:gal action. Nonrecognition is thus a
weak sanction, serving to registl:r lIIoral
and Icg:ll disapproval, and, Icgally, it
scrves to prevent the illegal aelor from
converting his illegal claim into a legal

one through the passage of time without
protest. This is a general principle equally applicahle t(i lIny iIl(:g:t1 dnim although it is most promincntly mcntioned in connection with illcgal conquest of territory. For example, the
United Statcs and other statcs protested
thc 200-mile territorial water claims of
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
Up to this point we have discussed
recognition in terms 0 f the recognizing'
state as a decisionmaker in fhe decentmlized international community. This
was an accurate picture IIntilthe present
era. We now reach the question whether
the most universal international organization, the United Nations, should follow the samc standards with respect to
recognition as individual statcs have
previously followed. In the past some
writers have argued that collective
reeognitioll by all international hody
would overcome the disadvantages of
the natiollal political element in the
trallitional process.
Whatever its theoretical advantages,
it is clear that in practice recognition [or
purposes of membership and represcntation is divorced from whether a particular member state recognizes another
member or its government outside the
United Nations. The stTUggle over admitting the Communist Chinese Government to official participation in the
United Nations produced a memorandum in 1950 by the Secretary General
in which he stated that they were
separate questions. He pointed out that
traditional recognition practice was unilateral and discretionary, and thaL states
have refused to accept a collective
reeognition procedure as a suhstitute for
their own discretion. In the United
Nations, however, dccisions on memhership and representation arc collective.
lie therefore argued that, for United
Nations purposes, the test should he
which govcrnment was the one in the
position to carry out the obligations of
membership most effeetivcly, rather
than which government was recognized
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by the members outside the United
Nations. In his opinion, acceptance of
his argument would have I(~d to till!
seating of the Communist Chine8e Government. However, his view was rejected
by a majority of the members and that
government has not yet been successful
in achieving representation in the
United Nations. The Nationalist Chinese
Government eontinues to represent the
state of China, an original member.
What is the position of the divided
states so far as membership in the
United Nations is concerned? In January of 1957 the Soviet Union proposed
that hoth Vietnams and both Koreas
should be admitted, arguing that they
were all states. The General Assembly
rejected the proposal. The sub8cquent
motion to cleet South Vietnam and
South Korea as members was vetoed by
the Soviet Union in the Security Council. In 19()6 East C ermany applied for
membership in the United Nations and,
in its application suggested West Germany should be simultaneously clected.
West Germany opposed the proposal,
arguing that East Germany was not a
state and that "it" violated human
rights. No action was taken. The divided
"states," therefore, continue to be excluded from membership in the United
Nations.
What is the status of these four areas
outside the United Nations? Here, of
course, the basic division with respect to
reeognition is along bloc lines, as Kaplan
and Katzenbach emphasize. A recent
inquiry to the State Department on this
question produced a reply in terllls of
diplomatic or lesser relations with a
regime rather than in terms of reeognition. As of June 1968, 64 nations
were said to I.ave diplomatic relations
with Nationalist China as compared
with 45 nations having diplomatic relations with Communist China, and 19
nations which did not have diplomatic
relations with either government. The
reply estimated that in January 196B
about 77 nations have diplomatic rela-

tions with South Korea and that 25
nations have diplomatic relations with
North Korea. With respect to Vil!tnllm,
the response spoke in terms of representation in Saigon or in Hanoi, which is
not very helpful for our recognition
question. On this hasis, as of January
19()7 ahout :m nations arc represenLed
in Saigon and, as of an un8peeified datl~,
about 22 nations in Ilanoi. This information on representation should he
compared wiLh a statement hy Professor
Moore of Virginia in a reeent article in
which he wrote that 60 nations have
recognized South Vietnam and that 24
nations have recognized North Vietnam.
Although he cites no specific source for
these statistics, they appear to be more
relevant and accurate for the purposes
of our inquiry. Finally, the State Department reply states that West Germany has diplomatic relations with at
least 70 countries and consular relations
with 16 more, with 13 of which there
may be also diplomatic relations. East
Germany is reported as having full
diplomatic relations with 16 countries
and lesser relations with 18 other countrie8. No date is given for these C;crlllan
8tatistics.
This report on till! staLus of the rival
Chincse GovcrJlnwnLs and of the dividl:d
"staLes" hoth within mill. outside LIII:
United Nations eoneiuiles this neel:ssarily broad surVl:y of lhe /t'gal al'p!!!;LS
of recogniLion of states and governments in international law and, to sOllie
extent, in the internal law of stales,
especially in the "foreign relaLions" Inw
of the United Stales. The scope of the
lecture did not permit examination of
every facet of the suhjcct, nor exhaustive treatment of any particular segment
that was included. II is hoped that this
introductory analysis of many of the
sil!:nifieaut problems in this complex
aren will stilllulall: tlw studl'uL Lo fOrJIlIIlate his own conclusions and wiII provide an adequate foundation for his
furlher exploration of this challenging
topic.

